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Abstract—The term ‘Prosopagnosia’ refers to the inability to 
identify people using visual facial cues as a result of brain injury 
[1]. A further term, ‘Developmental Prosopagnosia’, has been 
proposed to refer to a condition with a similar dysfunction, but 
here there is an absence of any external brain injury. In recent 
years, these terms have been used increasingly, despite the lack of 
evidence about which specific functions are involved, and how 
they are affected during the development of human facial feature 
processing. Furthermore, most of these studies seem to address a 
dysfunction, rather than a function that never developed or has 
been lost altogether.  
We propose clarifying the terminology by distinguishing between 
whether the function is absent (prosopagnosia) or functioning at 
a suboptimal level (prosopdysgnosia). This distinction is 
particularly important as an increasing number of studies 
indicate varying degrees of function, rather than a function that 
is either present or not. Focusing on the variations of 
dysfunctions may help to form a better understanding of how 
facial features are processed and used by different observers. 
Moreover, studies describing functions that are lost can help us 
to understand which parts of a network are critical for face 
perception. One model that may prove particularly useful, both 
in the general understanding of the dysfunction and in the 
specific possibilities regarding rehabilitation is the 
Reorganization of Elementary Functions model (REF) [2]. This 
model has recently been applied both within consciousness 
studies [3] and blindsight [4]. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Visual Agnosia is a rare deficit where the observer is no 
longer able to recognize objects based on visual information 
[5]. This condition has even been reported to affect very 
specific domains, such as facial identification, referred to as 
Prosopagnosia [1]. People with prosopagnosia can often use 
cues other than visual, in the task of identifying other people 
(e.g. the sound of a person’s voice). Nevertheless, they seem to 
have a profound “[…] inability to identify known people by the 
face” [6, p. 489]. The term ‘Prosopagnosia’ is often used not 
only to refer to a lost function, but also to dysfunctional facial 
recognition; here we argue that there is a need to distinguish 
between whether a function is missing (prosopagnosia), or 
merely operating at a suboptimal level (prosopdysgnosia). This 
clarification may ultimately yield a better understanding of the 
substrate underlying these cognitive functions and variations 
between observers, whereby we may progress towards a 
gradual understanding, where particular functions at one level 
of description may be achieved in different ways at the 
neuronal level [2,7]. 
 
Originally Bodamer [1] described patients who were able to 
identify individual facial features, while unable to bind these 
features together into a coherent whole; effectively rendering 
the patients unable to recognize people from facial information 
alone. A variety of prosopagnosia, seemingly not caused by 
injury or trauma, was later coined ‘Developmental 
Prosopagnosia’ [8]. Despite little initial attention, this 
dysfunction has since been reported with increasing frequency 
[9]. McConachie [8] described a 12-year old girl (AB) who 
was suffering from a severe deficit in facial identification and 
recognition. This became apparent when AB changed to a 
different school where the use of school uniforms prevented 
AB from using some of the feature cues she would normally 
rely on to identify people (i.e. clothing). Compensatory 
strategies potentially disguise cognitive deficits, as in the case 
of AB. Contrary to prior cases of prosopagnosia, AB did not 
seem to have any history or indication of traumatic injury, 
suggesting to McConachie [8] a developmental disorder. Also, 
AB’s mother reported that she herself had difficulties 
identifying faces, however, this deficiency was not as severe as 
in the case of AB [8]. Such findings, naturally give rise to 
speculations as to whether there may be a hereditary 
component in the deficit [10,11]. For our present purposes, 
Developmental Prosopagnosia could be considered as one end 
of the spectrum of in a function that can have varying degrees 
[12]. This is further substantiated by reports of observers who 
populate the opposite end of the spectrum, the so-called ‘super 
recognizers’ [13, see also 34].  
 
In a follow-up study of AB, De Haan and Campbell [6] 
reported that her deficit may not be limited to a severe 
dysfunction of facial recognition. She also has milder deficits, 
both in general object naming and in object recognition. It also 
seemed that AB had either retained or had developed some 
functions of face perception, since her performance was higher 
on a face-matching task [6]. Most studies of Developmental 
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Prosopagnosia rarely describe a pure inability to process face- 
specific information, as otherwise seemingly suggested by the 
label ‘agnosia’. Studies that report on diagnostic tools for 
prosopagnosia, typically demonstrate variations in performance 
between individual observers [e.g. 14,15, see also 35]. Often, a 
performance criterion of two standard deviations from the 
mean is used as a cut-off, which is implicitly indicative of a 
dysfunction, rather than a lacking function [16].  
 
Additionally, recent studies have begun to use the slightly 
different term of ‘Congenital Prosopagnosia’. This is treated 
synonymously with Developmental Prosopagnosia, and is 
defined as an “impairment in face processing that is apparent 
from birth in the absence of any brain damage” [17, p. 180]. 
Some authors may have preferred the term ‘Congenital 
Prosopagnosia’ over ‘Developmental Prosopagnosia’, as the 
latter term has also been used to refer to acquired 
Developmental Prosopagnosia [18]. Generally, both 
Developmental and Congenital Prosopagnosia are used more 
broadly, referring to both deficits and dysfunctions in facial 
recognition, that are not caused by head injury or trauma 
[9,19]. We believe both terms to be problematic when 
addressing cognitive functions that are not developed from 
birth. In particular, the latter term is highly questionable, as one 
may argue that all newborns have Congenital Prosopagnosia. 
In fact, studies have suggested that it is not possible to see 
normal perceptual processing biases until a few months after 
birth [e.g. 20]. Only after the visual system matures, may one 
see whether a child has a developmental disorder affecting the 
ability to recognize faces. 
 
As well as Developmental Prosopagnosia and Congenital 
Prosopagnosia, a third term has emerged, namely, ‘Hereditary 
Prosopagnosia’ [e.g. 10,11]. This also seem to be used 
analogous to the two other types of prosopagnosia, 
nevertheless, here the causal emphasis is on genetics (or 
upbringing). Studies of families, for example [e.g. 11], only 
give indirect evidence for hereditary components. One may 
indeed, question the contribution of nature and nurture in these 
types of studies. Both could be confounded by a number of 
other factors, such as how different people relate to their 
experiential qualia. As an example, it has long been argued that 
studies of synaesthesia suggest a hereditary element based on a 
strong female gender bias [e.g. 21]. Recent studies have 
established that this gender bias is, in fact, due to diverging 
cultural practices between how males and females discuss how 
they experience their surrounding environment [22]. To the 
knowledge of the author’s, explicit genetic studies of face 
recognition have yet to be performed. There are a number of 
studies of twins [23,24], however, where it has been questioned 
whether these findings relate specifically to face perception 
[25]. 
 
The decreased ability to recognize faces may reflect a 
function that is much more prone to individual variation than 
we usually assume [10,12]. Already in her original paper, 
McConachie [8] briefly speculated, as to whether the 
phenomenon may be more widespread in the general 
population. In related areas, where we see individual perceptual 
differences, such as synaesthesia mentioned above, observers 
discover the fact that they perceive the world differently from 
other people only rather late in their development [26]. 
Similarly, to the case of AB, where her difficulties went largely 
unnoticed, until an external event (the use of school uniforms) 
revealed that AB did not perceive the world similarly to her 
peers. If no such external pressure is experienced, then it is 
easy to imagine that many observers could be unaware of their 
synaesthesia, or in the present case, decreased performance in 
identification based on visual facial cues. Studies often suggest 
using a lifelong report of poor face recognition as an additional 
diagnostic characteristic in addition to the two standard 
deviation cut-off on more objective tasks; however, in the light 
of the example above, such subjective criterion does not seem 
valid. 
 
Our aim is to shift the emphasis from cause to function. We 
propose the more accurate term ‘Prosopdysgnosia’ (or 
‘Prosopodysgnosia’) in order to emphasize a decrease in ability 
compared to a neurotypical observer, rather than 
Developmental, Congenital, or Hereditary Prosopagnosia; as 
all of these latter seem to carry connotations of cause. 
Naturally, if the decrease in function can be linked to a specific 
cause, such as a trauma, we find it relevant to add ‘acquired’, 
and if other causal links can be established (e.g. 
developmental) for prosopdysgnosia (or prosopagnosia) then it 
would make sense to use developmental prosopdysgnosia. 
However, it still seems that more work is needed before one 
can ascribe the cases to developmental disorders with any 
certainty. Even in the absence of any evidence of external 
trauma, it is still difficult to fully rule out the possibility that a 
dysfunction is not actually due to an external cause. Hence one 
may argue that McConachie [8] was premature in coining a 
term for something in the absence of evidence. Imaging studies 
have sometimes had difficulties distinguishing observers with 
Developmental Prosopagnosia from neurotypical observers 
[see 12]. Moreover, if face perception is a varying spectrum in 
the normal population, then Developmental Prosopagnosia at 
times would also be much more similar to neurotypical 
observers than would the very severe cases originally reported 
by Bodamer [1].  
 
Also, work linking face perception to general expertise 
seems to further support the proposed distinction [e.g. 25,27]. 
Investigations of face perception often reveal that observers 
have a processing advantage for upright compared to inverted 
faces [e.g. 27]. In a group of colour-grapheme synaesthetes we 
have previously shown a decreased upright advantage, but only 
a few of our observers had complaints related to their ability to 
recognize faces [28]. Moreover, Gauthier et al. [25] recently 
linked poor performance on face-recognition tasks to a general 
decrease in object recognition (as also later reported in AB 
[6]); this allows for some speculation into the degree of 
difference between face perception and object perception.  
 
In addition, studies of the so-called ‘own-race bias’ in 
perception – a bias in the perceptual processing of faces – 
further demonstrate that this process is not present from birth 
and this bias is only established when the child is at least three 
months old [20]. Moreover, a study by Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy, 
and Hodes [29] showed that the own-race bias is established 
through an interaction with the surrounding environment, 
supporting the idea that face perception is acquired, and is fine-
tuned through environmental exposure and expertise. 
 
If, in fact, face and object perception are modulated by a 
general domain non-specific function, as suggested by Gauthier 
et al. [25], which develops through environmental exposure 
and interaction [20,29], then it is even more important to be 
able to locate the underlying domain-specific substrates in face 
perception. This may prove important in the development of 
intervention strategies for people with suboptimal facial 
recognition. These in turn, may not be an effective method in 
treating more severe cases of prosopagnosia. 
 
With some caution, one might also consider the theoretical 
consequences of the argument above. The debate between 
strong localization and the equipotentiality of the brain has 
historically been discussed with varying emphasis, reaching a 
compromise between the two extreme positions today [30]. If 
we accept that cognitive functions such as perception are 
represented in varying degrees [12, see also 31], rather than as 
cognitive modules [32]. Cognitive functions, such as face 
perception, may be described as processes of interacting 
strategies rather than separated, individual modules, hereby 
relating to different neural networks. This would mean for 
instance that face perception may be achieved in a number of 
different ways encompassing varying strategies from observer 
to observer [e.g. 2,30]. The proposal of a distinction between 
prosopagnosia and prosopdysgnosia seem to support this view. 
Which is further supported by the number of varying sub-
strategies that can be employed to identify other people, as an 
example, some people have been reported who have difficulties 
in identifying others from their voice alone (phonagnosia) 
similar to prosopagnosia in vision [36,37].   
 
One model of functional reorganization following brain 
damage, does in fact predict that a neural injury may not result 
in the permanent abolishment of particular functions, but, 
rather, in the development of different strategies to replace 
them. In the recently proposed Reorganization of Elementary 
Functions (REF) model, the orchestration of ‘elementary 
functions’ (specific functions localized to a particular neural 
region) form ‘algorithmic strategies’ in larger brain networks 
[2]. According to the model, such algorithmic strategies 
subserve behavioural and cognitive functions, but not in a 1 to 
1 fashion [7]. Rather, in the case of an injury to some region in 
the brain, following which some elementary functions are 
damaged, the associated strategies and behaviour or cognition 
are also (temporarily) lost. However, in many cases, new 
strategies consisting of different or partially different sets of 
elementary functions realize the relevant behaviour or 
cognition. Nevertheless, at the level of the algorithmic 
strategies, the same function will be realized in a different way. 
In this view, it is highly plausible that we may find intervention 
strategies that can alleviate milder problems like 
prosopdysgnosia, whereas the damage to elementary functions 
in prosopagnosia may be too severe to be rehabilitated.  
 
Models, such as the REF-model unfold a more complex 
picture of different possible strategies with different degrees of 
efficiency. As such, they fit nicely into other developments in 
visual perception research, where conscious experience of 
objects contains several levels of representation [see 31,33]. 
Moreover, this corresponds to the different strategies used in 
identifying people, where we rely on a number of different 
cues (e.g. clothes as in the case of AB). 
II. CONCLUSION 
We believe that the emphasis on function should be 
explicit, similarly to the distinctions between alexia and 
dyslexia. Moreover, distinguishing pure cases of prosopagnosia 
from different kinds of prosopdysgnosia may lead to a better 
understanding of the neural mechanisms constituting the 
algorithmic strategies behind face perception. Furthermore, the 
difficulty in accurately gaging the cause of the developmental 
disorder, seem to warrant the more accurate term 
‘prosopdysgnosia’, and therefore the term ‘prosopagnosia’ 
should be reserved for cases where the facial identification 
through visual cues is abolished, or severely limited. 
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